Indirect Discourse: Parataxis, the Propositional Function Modification, and “That”

MICHAEL ALAN JOHNSON

In “On Saying That,” Donald Davidson offered an analysis of indirect discourse that was meant to overcome the classic difficulties of a semantic theory of indirect discourse. Additionally, Davidson’s treatment of indirect discourse was purported to further his project of explaining meaning in a purely extensional, explicitly truth-defined, and compositional manner. The particular paratactic theory that Davidson introduced to accomplish his purposes has been influential and widely debated ever since 1968.

Many criticisms of Davidson’s theory have attacked the idea that the object to which indirect discourse report-clauses\(^1\) refer is an utterance. However, recent attempts to salvage the paratactic theory—most notably by Gary Kemp—have tried to retain the paratactic logical form and the distinctive character of the Davidsonian theory in face of these objections by offering alternative accounts of what it is that indirect discourse report-clauses refer to. In this paper I will argue that Kemp’s account fails to offer a suitable replacement for the role of the “utterance” in Davidson’s theory. Moreover, in addition to critiquing Kemp specifically, I will show that Kemp’s strategy of modifying this one particular aspect of Davidson’s paratactic theory is inadequate to salvage the plausibility of Davidson’s theory, even if Kemp’s modifications were successful.

\(^1\) See footnote 6 for information on my use of the terms report-clause, report-sentence, content-clause, and content-sentence.

Michael Alan Johnson has recently finished undergraduate work, earning a B.A. (Honors) in philosophy and history. He will soon be applying to do graduate work in philosophy and hopes to work in the areas of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.
In section 1, I will briefly introduce the problem of substitutability in indirect discourse and present Davidson’s paratactic theory as a response to it. I will then (section 2) mention a critique, known as the ambiguity problem, that has been leveled against Davidson’s paratactic theory. This critique targets the role Davidson assigns to *utterances* in the paratactic theory. Section 3 will be dedicated to Kemp’s modified paratactic theory and will include an overview of his essential arguments that contend that his modified paratactic theory defends against the ambiguity problem. This will be followed by my objections to Kemp’s modifications and by a new formulation of the ambiguity problem. The final section (section 4) will introduce arguments against the plausibility of the paratactic theory generally. I will conclude by arguing that, even if it were possible to formulate a paratactic theory of indirect discourse that avoids “utterance objections” (like the ambiguity problem), there are yet more damaging and basic problems to be addressed.

1

Donald Davidson’s treatment of indirect discourse in “On Saying That” is greatly motivated by his larger aims in the philosophy of language. As a part of these aims, Davidson argues that a successful account of a given language would extensionally define the truth-conditions of that language’s finite vocabulary and determine the rules for composition of terms (and their corresponding truth-conditions). Davidson thinks that if these requirements were met for a given language, then one would have all of the resources one needs to compositionally understand an infinite number of statements within that language.

Indirect discourse reports present a particularly difficult challenge to Davidson’s aims, as the ordinary rules for semantics of a term sometimes fail within the scope of an indirect discourse report. For example, ordinarily, co-extensive—or at least co-referential—terms are substitutable *salva veritate*. “Hesperus is highly volcanic,” remains true even if “Phosphorus” replaces “Hesperus.” This substitutability is made possible by the two terms’ semantic properties. However, while “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are substitutable *salva veritate* in ordinary circumstances, they are not clearly substitutable *salva veritate* within the scope of an indirect discourse report. Consider, “Attila said that Hesperus is his favorite celestial object.” In this example, it is not clear that “Phosphorus” is substitutable for “Hesperus”

2 This problem is, of course, not unique to *oratio obliqua*, but is well-known and much discussed among philosophers dealing with the issue of propositional attitudes generally. Gottlob Frege’s “Sense and Reference” (originally published in 1892) is an early attempt to handle this issue.
without altering the truth-conditions or even the truth-value of the entire indirect discourse report. Davidson’s 1968 article is an attempt to respond to the substitutability problem and to shed light on the nature of indirect discourse.

The paratactic theory is an attempt to make clear the logical form of indirect discourse reports and to thereby surmount the problems of aberrant semantic behavior within the context of indirect discourse. Davidson advances the idea that the key to understanding indirect discourse lies in seeing that the actual logical form of a standard indirect discourse report involves two separate sentences, related to each other only by a demonstrative. According to Davidson, the first of these sentences is the report of an action, namely, a person \( x \) having said something. This first sentence amounts to “an expression referring to a speaker, the two-place predicate ‘said,’ and a demonstrative referring to an utterance” (142). The second sentence is a specific utterance purported to match the content of what it is that \( P \) said, and it is denoted by the demonstrative “that” of the first sentence. The utterance referred to by “that” is said to have \( \text{same said} \) what it is being used to report if and only if it is true that it “match[es] in content” the utterance it is being used to report (143).

According to Davidson, the two sentences making up an indirect discourse report are semantically and logically independent of each other. However, the sentences retain a relationship in that the first sentence refers to the second by means of the demonstrative “that.”

Let’s see how this plays out using Davidson’s original example.

(1) Galileo said that the earth moves.

becomes

(2) Galileo said that.

The earth moves.

By using “that” as a demonstrative connecting two distinct sentences, as well as by taking some “tiny orthographic” liberties, Davidson is able to make an intuitively plausible case that the logical form of indirect discourse reports is composed of two semantically innocent sentences (142).

Davidson thinks that neither of the two sentences requires that their constituent terms sacrifice their usual semantic properties for being within the scope of a “that” clause. This innocence can be attained because the content-clause “the earth moves” is not embedded in the speech-report clause “Galileo said that;” both clauses are semantically independent of

\[3\] Namely, we take the liberty of ignoring punctuation and clause-order when dealing with the logical form of indirect discourse reports.
the other. The clause “Galileo said that” bears the logical form of a self-sufficient sentence and declares Galileo’s having said something. Furthermore, it indicates that what Galileo said will be indicated by the utterance following. The utterance following also bears the logical form of a lone sentence. It is a self-sufficient utterance made in a standard logical context that has been announced as conveying the content of what Galileo said.

If Davidson is correct regarding the logical form of indirect discourse reports, and if what appears to be a single complex sentence is actually two sentences, then there is a simple and intuitive way out of the apparent problems of analyzing indirect discourse. First, the general semantics of indirect discourse are no longer mysterious or aberrant. If we are not led astray by the single-sentence surface-form of the indirect discourse report, what we will find are two sentences that afford standard semantic evaluation. Therefore, indirect discourse is not semantically problematic. Second, the apparent problem of substitutability can be solved. The issue stems from considering an indirect discourse report as a single sentence that has its own truth conditions—a circumstance in which substitution of like terms should not alter the truth of the sentence. If the phenomenon of truth-change, subsequent to a substitution, is viewed from the perspective that the indirect discourse report is logically singular, one must conclude that indirect discourse contexts are semantically deviant in not allowing for extensional substitutions. But Davidson’s proposal escapes this trap.

How is it that the basis of the semantic problem of substitutability dissolves when the Davidsonian two-sentence logical form is applied? Under Davidson’s two-sentence analysis, neither the content-sentence nor the report-sentence undergoes changes in truth when an extensional substitution is performed. However, a substitution in one sentence may affect the truth of the other. A substitution \textit{salva veritate} in the content-sentence would change the utterance that is referred to by “that” in the report-sentence and thereby might alter the truth of the report-sentence. This change of truth-value in the sentence not undergoing substitution suffices to explain why a one-sentence analysis of indirect discourse would be unable to account for the change in truth-conditions of the greater indirect discourse report and the apparent semantic deviance of indirect discourse reports. Albeit, the changes of truth-value are not aberrant or mysterious so long as one recognizes two semantically innocent sentences: a content-sentence that undergoes an extensional substitution \textit{salva veritate} and another sentence that may change in truth because its referent (the uttering of the content-sentence) has been altered.
One argument that has been insistently leveled against Davidson’s paratactic theory is based on instances of ambiguity in indirect discourse. This ambiguity problem has been articulated by Rumfitt and Frankish, among others, and is one of the major problems against which Kemp attempts to defend the paratactic theory. Kemp goes so far as to say that the ambiguity problem is serious enough that it shows Davidson’s original paratactic theory to be unsound. In order to explore the problem, let’s take a case of ambiguous indirect discourse reporting, as in (3).\footnote{(3) is the example used by both Rumfitt and Frankish.}

(3) John said that someone heard the shooting of the hunters.

The content-clause of (3), “someone heard the shooting of the hunters,” is syntactically ambiguous between two distinct interpretations. On the one hand hunters may be getting shot, or on the other hand the hunters may be shooting. Davidson’s construal of (3) looks like this:

\begin{align*}
(3') & (a) \text{ John said that.} \\
& (b) \text{ Someone heard the shooting of the hunters.}\footnote{(a) is an instance of what I will refer to as a report-sentence. (b) is a content-sentence. Use of either of the “-sentence” terms will be indicative of a paratactic theory of indirect discourse since the paratactic theory stipulates that surface grammar report-clauses and content-clauses should be analyzed as sentential paratactic pairs, e.g. (3’). I will use the terms report-clause and content-clause to refer to parts of a surface analysis or to nonparatactic analysis of a single-sentence indirect discourse report, such as (3). I will use report-clause to refer to everything preceding and including the word “that” in (3) and content-clause to refer to everything after “that.” This rule will apply in all cases of indirect discourse that bear the form of (3).}
\end{align*}

Or:

\begin{align*}
(3'') & \text{samesaid (x, that). u.}
\end{align*}

where $x$ stands for a speaker, $u$ is an utterance, “that” denotes the utterance $u$, and “samesaid” is a two-place predicate indicating that what $x$ said bore the same content as the utterance $u$. Now, we have noted that in the case of (3), the utterance “Someone heard the shooting of the hunters” is ambiguous and thus does not have a determined content. Although the utterance (b) may have two distinct meanings or interpretations, it does not convey the content of either of its interpretations as it stands. So, how does this relate to Davidson’s theory?

The function of (a) in Davidson’s theory is to singularly designate an utterance (b) as bearing the content of what John said. But if it cannot
identify a content-bearing utterance, then there is no object which could have a samesaying relation with any other, as samesaying consists of two utterances expressing the same content. Moreover, the very logical form of (a) necessitates that for it to be meaningful, that is, to do the work of a report-clause, it must designate an utterance which affords clear content to be used in a samesaying relation, as this is precisely what Davidson takes “said that” to mean. However, being an ambiguous utterance, (b) does not bear distinct content.

The problem is that, though it is unknown which of the two interpretations of the utterance (b) is being attributed to John, in Davidson’s theory (a) must still operate according to the form that it unequivocally attributes to John the content of utterance (b). If (b) is ambiguous, then no content can be unequivocally attributed to John, and the whole logical machine by which Davidson takes indirect discourse report-clauses to work breaks down. Even beyond the ambiguity issue, it is unclear that “John said that” can mean anything under Davidson’s treatment. “John said that” cannot be any sort of attribution of samesaying, as nothing that qualifies for the samesaying relation is truly picked out by “that.”

In Davidson’s theory, we are then left with the unacceptable consequence that (a) and other report-clauses become unintelligible in the context of their referring to an ambiguous utterance. In response to this, we must either bite the bullet and settle for the fact that Davidson’s theory makes the meaning of report-clauses indeterminable in the context of ambiguous reports, or we must modify the theory.

There is little choice here: it is absolutely clear what “John said that” means, regardless of whether or not it is followed by an ambiguous utterance, and the logical form we assign to the report-clause must account for this fact. We must therefore conclude that Davidson’s ideas regarding indirect discourse should be modified so that the logical form of ambiguous speech reports such as (3) do not make the report-clauses of indirect discourse reports unintelligible.

Kemp’s paper offers a modification of Davidson’s paratactic theory that is purported to avoid the ambiguity problem as well as other objections. Kemp’s strategy for his revised variant of the paratactic theory is to fill, with propositions, the role that utterances played in Davidson’s original theory. By changing the entity referred to by the report-clause of indirect discourse, Kemp hopes to avoid the problems (such as the ambiguity problem) that are linked to the characteristics of utterances.
Kemp defends at length the idea that a Davidsonian approach to the philosophy of language may allow for the use of some form of propositions, if only for use in a limited capacity as a metalinguistic explanatory device sans ontological commitments. Kemp’s new, proposition-charged paratactic theory (what I will hereafter call the prop-function theory) is expressly designed to overcome major difficulties plaguing the role of utterances in Davidson’s original theory. For example, Kemp uses his prop-function theory as a response to Schiffer’s well-known arguments for the untenability of extending the paratactic theory from indirect discourse to propositional attitude reports generally, and for the infamous “counting problem.” Of course, Kemp also hopes to avoid the ambiguity problem.

Kemp’s solution to the ambiguity problem is to get rid of Davidson’s logical explanation of the function of “that”—according to which “that” refers to a single and fixed occasion of an utterance. This was how Davidson provided the content of an indirect discourse attribution. Kemp notes (as we did above) that Davidson’s analysis of report-clauses as report-sentences is sure to misfire in cases where “that” refers to a clear and fixed utterance that is not clear and fixed in its content.

Instead, Kemp advocates that we permit “a function from a context of utterance to a proposition,” which would thereby allow us to replace the old target content of indirect discourse (utterances) with utterances expressing propositions (139). Kemp’s prop-function theory variant of (1) would have this form:

(4) SAID (Galileo, the proposition expressed by that). The earth moves.

In (4), the two-place predicate “SAID” obtains between a speaker and a proposition y if the speaker made an utterance that expresses y.

The prop-function theory retains most of the advantages of Davidson’s original paratactic theory, while simultaneously responding to a number of problems. Kemp’s theory is particularly suitable for extending the paratactic theory to all manner of propositional attitude reports, as it offers more “appropriate” objects (propositions) for the wide range of propositional attitudes.

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6 Kemp finds it acceptable to invoke the concept of a proposition in just the same cases where Davidson invokes synonymy: “so long as we do so only within the particular lexical region of the metalanguage used to interpret a certain species of object-language utterance, and not as ‘the foundation of a theory of language’” (Kemp 149).

7 Kemp understands his propositions to require only the concept of synonymy that Davidson already utilizes, so our rule for propositions is that any two utterances express the same proposition if and only if they are synonymous.
Kemp’s theory also seems to help with the classic ambiguity problem. If taken in terms of Kemp’s theory, (3) would be represented thus:

\[(5) \text{SAID (John, the proposition expressed by that).} \]

Someone heard the shooting of the hunters.

Kemp’s general form for indirect discourse can be represented as: \text{SAID (speaker, the proposition expressed by } u \text{).} u. \text{ In light of this, Kemp’s claim is that (5) avoids the ambiguity problem because “if } u \text{ is ambiguous then so is the singular term ‘the proposition expressed by } u \text{’” (140).}

Kemp’s prop-function theory escapes the Davidsonian ambiguity problem because “that” in (5) could be referring to one of two things, specifically, one of the two propositions that could be expressed by “Someone heard the shooting of the hunters.” This analysis seems to lead to an intuitively correct understanding of (3). The report-clause does its job: John has been reported as saying something. Though what exactly he said is unclear, because the content-clause of (3) is ambiguous, the report-clause can successfully cope with this by allowing the object of the demonstrative “that” to share the ambiguity of the content-clause, instead of requiring, as Davidson’s theory does, that “that” pick out the ambiguous utterance as conveying the unambiguous content of what John is saying. This seems to be quite agreeable.

That being said, Kemp’s version of the paratactic theory fails to adequately handle a variation of the ambiguity problem which I will now introduce. Let’s take a situation in which two acquaintances, say Attila and Jannai, are having a conversation. The conversation turns out to be quite one-sided, with Attila doing most of the talking. Jannai begins to lose focus on what Attila is talking about and instead tries to bring to mind the things he hopes to accomplish that week. Jannai soon regains his focus and tunes back into the conversation only to hear Attila somewhat inexplicably say this:

\[(6) \text{Someone heard the shooting of the hunters.} \]

The context of the conversation does not help in clarifying what Attila meant by (6), and because Jannai is in a hurry and knows of Attila’s tendency to prate, Jannai does not ask Attila to disambiguate what was said. With that, the conversation ends. Now, consider Jannai’s prospects for using a standard-form indirect discourse report to inform someone of Attila’s having said (6).

According to Kemp’s prop-function analysis of paratactic theory, if Jannai were to tell someone the story of his interaction with Attila, and had
to relay the occurrence of Attila’s saying (6), then the form of such indirect discourse would look like (7):

(7) SAID (Attila, the proposition expressed by that.)
    Someone heard the shooting of the hunters.

Assuming that Jannai were to say

Attila said that someone heard the shooting of the hunters.

In (7), as in (5), the “that” of “Attila said that” would be ambiguous as to which of two propositions it denotes, and the report-clause of which “that” is a constituent would successfully report that Attila had said something that expresses one of the two propositions conveyed by the following:

Someone heard the hunters being shot.

Someone heard the hunters shooting.

But this clearly gives us the wrong result. In ordinary communication, Jannai is not reporting ambiguously in the case of (7), he is in fact reporting the exact character of what Attila said. In this case, “that” should not refer to one of the two propositions possibly expressed by “someone heard the shooting of the hunters,” but instead it should refer to the ambiguous utterance “someone heard the shooting of the hunters” itself. Therefore, the use of “that” in (7) should not be ambiguous between two referents as it must be in order to respond to the classic ambiguity problem.

The report-sentence of (7) must refer to “someone heard the shooting of the hunters” as what Attila said. However, the prop-function theory does not allow for this report because its analysis of (7) stipulates that if “that” refers to an ambiguous utterance, then “that” is ambiguous, referring to one or the other of the propositions expressed by “someone heard the shooting of the hunters.” Because of this, Kemp’s theory cannot account for cases of indirect discourse in which an ambiguous utterance is deliberately attributed to a speaker, even though Kemp’s theory is helpful with classic cases in which someone reports ambiguously something that they intended to convey unambiguously.

It may be objected that reporting instances of ambiguity such as (7) should fall into the domain of quotation’s responsibilities. That is to say, if Jannai cares to relate to someone else what Attila said, Jannai should say something like the following:

Attila said, and I quote, “Someone heard the shooting of the hunters.”
This would certainly do the trick. However, it does not seem that the logical form of indirect discourse should have to confine a speaker to the quotation strategy shown above. If an unacceptable consequence of the original Davidsonian theory is that it cannot successfully deal with fairly normal cases of ambiguity in indirect discourse, then this is unacceptable for Kemp’s theory as well.

After all, one can imagine a situation in which it is perfectly clear that Jannai means to attribute the utterance “Someone heard the shooting of the hunters,” ambiguity and all, to Attila. For example, Jannai might say the following:

Today, Attila told me something, but he phrased it ambiguously.

Attila said that someone heard the shooting of the hunters.

Unfortunately, under Kemp’s analysis, the above instance of Jannai’s indirect discourse would have to be analyzed in the same manner as (7), and regardless of the obvious meaning of what Jannai said in the above context, the report-clause regarding what Attila said would have to be ambiguous. “That” would have to refer to one of the two propositions expressed by the utterance that follows it. And the fact that Jannai would have prefaced his indirect discourse report with the disclaimer that he meant to attribute something ambiguous to Attila would be betrayed by an analysis of his indirect discourse that necessitates that Jannai meant to refer to one of the definite propositions that could be expressed by the ambiguous utterance. Therefore, according to Kemp’s theory, even in the above context what Jannai is claiming that Attila said would have to be considered ambiguous.

These are the same entailments of Kemp’s theory that were welcomed when dealing with the original ambiguity problem, but with my variation on the ambiguity problem the supposed advantages of Kemp’s theory lead to wildly implausible results.

Let’s take this issue further yet. Consider a counterexample based on discourse deixis. The deictic element of the following example highlights the notion that indirect discourse can be clearly preferable to quotation in reporting someone’s having said something ambiguous. The obvious normality and success of the indirect discourse in the example demonstrates that a successful theory of indirect discourse must be able to account for my version of the ambiguity problem.
Suppose that Attila remarks to Jannai that Lincoln, a mutual friend, “heard the shooting of the hunters.” Later, Jannai runs into Lincoln in the hallway and opens the conversation with the following:

Attila said that you heard the shooting of the hunters. What did he mean by that?

There is no need for Jannai to quote Attila in the above example. In fact, it would be somewhat odd for him to have said, “Attila said Lincoln heard the shooting of the hunters,” when speaking to Lincoln, and it would have been quite roundabout for Jannai to have opened the conversation with, “Attila said, and I quote, ‘Lincoln heard the shooting of the hunters.’” While Jannai could use quotation to meet his desired end, indirect discourse is clearly a more efficient and standard means of communication. Moreover, it is absolutely clear what Jannai is reporting Attila to have said, and an adequate theory of indirect discourse must be able to account for the type of examples of which the above is a token.

Kemp’s analysis is evidently not an “adequate” one, as the form he assigns to Jannai’s indirect discourse report in the above example once again leaves us with absurd results. For example, Lincoln would have to ask Jannai to disambiguate which specific proposition of the ambiguous content-clause Jannai is claiming that Attila said in order to even understand Jannai’s indirect discourse report. Of course, this would entirely defeat the purpose of Jannai’s inquiry. Kemp’s proposals regarding logical form obviously cannot account for this new variation of the ambiguity problem. So, using propositions as the objects referred to by “that” in indirect discourse fails in the face of an ambiguity problem, just as using utterances fails in the face of a different ambiguity problem.

It could be proposed that the prop-function theory can be saved by making a minor modification, one that stipulates that if the target utterance of an indirect discourse ascription is ambiguous and could express several propositions, then instead of “that” being ambiguous between the propositions it would denote all of them:

SAID (speaker, the proposition(s) expressed by that). u.

This would mean that if the content-clause (u) were ambiguous, then the “speaker” is being reported as having said an utterance that shares the same sort of ambiguity between the same propositions as u. However, this would be exactly tantamount to the original Davidsonian paratactic theory (that targets utterances in the case of ambiguity) because Kemp’s principle for abstracting propositions from utterances is that if two utterances are synonymous, then they express the same proposition.
Kemp’s prop-function theory helped to avoid the original ambiguity problem by offering some object which could be referred to as an aid in disambiguating indirect discourse. However, if in order to deal with my new variation on the ambiguity problem, Kemp’s theory must be modified so that “that” refers to the set of propositions expressed by the content-clause in indirect discourse, then it will have lost the very means by which it overcame the original ambiguity problem.

In this concluding section I will move beyond Kemp’s modified paratactic theory, which I have specifically shown to be unsound, in order to note that most any formulation of the paratactic theory of indirect discourse is implausible. Furthermore, I will assert that this is the case regardless of whether Kemp’s project, and others like it, succeed or fail. There is a deeper problem for the paratactic theory than adequately determining what sort of object a content-clause can express.

The paratactic proposal’s plausibility relies on there being a demonstrative that relates the report-sentence to the content-sentence of an indirect discourse report. This demonstrative is necessary to relate what Davidson takes to be two logically independent sentences in a manner that may be intuitively believed to be the embedding of a clause in a broader sentence. Without the word “that” playing a demonstrative role in establishing the paratactic relationship, the paratactic theory would lose all of the viability that it owes to the surface structure of sentences.

Unfortunately for the paratactic theory, there are many good reasons to suppose that “that,” in the context of indirect discourse, is not a demonstrative at all. Instead, “that” appears to function as a complementizer. This fact acutely weakens the case for the paratactic theory. I will quickly note a few of the arguments against the demonstrative interpretation of “that” before offering some observations of my own.

Segal and Speas, for example, apply the “that” of indirect discourse to the tests used by linguists to determine whether an occurrence of “that” functions demonstratively or as a complementizer. On every count, they found that the “that” of ordinary English indirect discourse fails to act as a demonstrative. For example, the two divergent usages of the word “that,” known as $d$-that and $c$-that,\(^8\) have slightly divergent phonetic properties

\(^8\) Naturally, $d$-that denotes the demonstrative “that,” and $c$-that denotes the complementizer “that.”
in certain contexts. The “that” of indirect discourse shares its phonetic properties with c-that. Furthermore, c-that is deletable in most every sentential context, while d-that is not. For example, it is acceptable to remove the complementizer “that” from, “He’s the man that I wanted to marry,” but it is not acceptable to drop the demonstrative “that” from, “Hey look at that man over there!” Once again, “that” as used in indirect discourse shares its properties with c-that, this time in virtue of its deletability. Segal and Speas conclude that because “that” in indirect discourse is a complementizer, “there are straightforward empirical arguments against viewing [indirect discourse] as paratactic” (129).

In addition to the very strong arguments above, there is another problem regarding the putatively demonstrative “that” of indirect discourse that is noted by some philosophers and linguists. This is the problem of foreign languages, and it is a problem to which I hope to add some force with my own considerations. Schiffer and others have highlighted the fact that some foreign languages, such as French, do not use any terms in standard indirect discourse reports that are used as, or are homophonic with, demonstratives. Davidson’s theory seems to be incapable of applying to such foreign-language indirect discourse reports because there is no term in an indirect discourse report-clause that can serve to denote the content-clause.

This is a well-known issue that I wish to aggravate by adding Hungarian to the list of languages that seem to discredit Davidson’s theory. The Hungarian language can play a unique role in the discreditation of the paratactic theory, as we shall see. This is attributable to the fact that the standard form of Hungarian indirect discourse reports contain both a demonstrative and a complementizer. This is unlike other languages currently discussed in relation to the paratactic theory.

(8) Attila azt mondta, hogy . . .

(8) is a report-clause of a standard Hungarian discourse report. “Attila” is a name, “azt” translates to “this” or “that,” “mondta” translates to “said,”

9 Specifically, although the demonstrative pronoun “that” must be pronounced [ðæt], informal speech allows “that,” used as a complementizer, to afford vowel-reduced pronunciation: [ðət].

10 Further evidence against considering the “that” of indirect discourse to be a demonstrative is offered by Hand, who notes that the use of “that” to demonstrate a segment of discourse subsequent to its usage is “conversationally aberrant,” and that using “this” for that purpose is the only precedent (356).

11 For example Schiffer, Segal, and Speas.

12 Notably, the French and Spanish languages have been used against the paratactic theory.
and “hogy” translates to *-that, as it cannot be used as a demonstrative. Therefore, (8) is something like “Attila that said, *-that . . . ,” and would then be followed by a content-clause.

Now, if Davidson’s proposals regarding the demonstrative role of “that” are correct, then in Hungarian the word “azt” (the demonstrative) would presumably be indispensable in (8). However, this is not the case. The following examples illustrate this.¹³

(9) Attila mondtा hogy . . .
(10) *Attila azt mondtа . . .
(10’) *Attilа mondta azt . . .

(9) represents a common Hungarian variation on (8) that is commonly used and perfectly understood. Note that (9) has omitted “azt” from the report-clause, and recall that “azt” is the only word from the clause that could translate as *-that. Still, (9) retains its complementizer “hogy,” and makes perfect sense.

The reverse cases do not fare well, however. (10) and (10’) are examples in which the complementizer “hogy” is dropped in favor of using the demonstrative “azt” exclusively. Both of these examples, when followed by content-clauses, fail to make sense.¹⁴

These results seem to indicate that the demonstrative in Hungarian indirect discourse is entirely superfluous while the complementizer is essential. Hungarian report-clauses that make exclusive use of a proper complementizer make sense, while those that make exclusive use of a demonstrative do not. By its deletability, as well as by its uselessness without a complementizer, the demonstrative “azt” proves not to be demonstrating anything.

It is also worth noting that the Hungarian examples may show Davidson to be misguided not only in his ideas regarding the role of demonstratives, but also in regards to the applicability of parataxis itself to indirect discourse. Neither (8) nor (9) can stand alone as syntactically acceptable sentences. In order to split a Hungarian indirect discourse report into two separate sentences one must either have a nonsensical report sentence that does not successfully refer to its paratactic partner, or remove the word “hogy” and make the report-sentence into something like (10) or (10’),

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¹³ An asterisk preceding a given example indicates ungrammaticality.

¹⁴ Consider: *“Attilа azt mondtа menjünk innen haverok.” With the addition of “hogy,” the sentence would be grammatical and could be glossed as “Attilа said that we should get out of here, guys.”
two examples which do not suffice as indirect discourse when a content-clause is appended. Neither alternative is acceptable.

As we have seen, the original paratactic theory of indirect discourse requires modification if it is to escape the numerous problems with which it is faced. Kemp’s attempt at modifying the paratactic theory of indirect discourse fails to account for my variant of the ambiguity problem, and thus does not succeed in presenting a tenable alternative to Davidson’s original formulation of the paratactic theory. Moreover, the paratactic theory has shown itself to rest on empirically and theoretically dubitable ideas regarding demonstrativity and parataxis. These put it in more basic trouble than Kemp or other theory-tweakers could account for even if their modified theories prevailed against critiques.

Without the *prima facie* evidence of some surface-grammar indication of the viability of two-sentence parataxis, the paratactic proposal becomes a theory of logical form without any apparent justification, except reliable predictions and sound results. However, the paratactic theory lacks even that shaky foundation, for, as we have noted, the analyses offered of the paratactic theory’s functions fail to produce reliable predictions and sound results.
Works Cited