On the Contrast between Pity and Compassion in Nietzsche

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Some have dared to call pity a virtue (in every noble ethic it is considered a weakness); and as if it were not enough, it has been made the virtue, the basis and source of all virtues. To be sure—and one should always keep this in mind—this was done by a philosophy that was nihilistic and had inscribed the negation of life upon its shield. (Antichrist1 573)

The story of Friedrich Nietzsche’s lapse into insanity is well known. His mental breakdown began in the winter of 1888. At the turning point in his descent to madness, he saw a mare being beaten savagely in the streets of Turin. Overwhelmed with horror and sympathy, Nietzsche ran into the street and embraced the beast (Thiele 91n). How could Nietzsche respond to the horse’s suffering with such pity, when as a philosopher he condemned that emotion as a sign of degeneracy? This story suggests that since Nietzsche considered suffering to be the central problem of existence, his rejection of pity as a response to suffering is of great importance to his philosophy. While many ethical theories embrace pity as the basis of morality, Nietzsche denounces it as a sick, life-negating, dangerous and hypocritical virtue. In this essay, I would like to examine Nietzsche’s criticism of pity and to suggest that pity is

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1The Antichrist will hereafter be referred to as A, On the Genealogy of Morals as GM, Twilight of the Idols as T, The Gay Science as GS, Thus Spoke Zarathustra as Z, Beyond Good and Evil as BGE, and The Birth of Tragedy as BOT.
not the only way to confront the suffering of one’s fellowman. I will suggest that in the strong, pity can be reoriented in a life-affirming manner, which I will call “compassion.” The response to suffering through compassion is not only suggested in Nietzsche’s writing, but it also follows from his ideal of the noble individual and from his doctrines of the will to power and *amor fati*. However, in ultimately arguing for an isolationist form of self-perfection, Nietzsche actually reveals his own inability to confront suffering and mediocrity.

Nietzsche fancies himself a physician of culture. With his “sounding fork” of culture, he attempts to penetrate the truth behind our idols. While pity is venerated as the altruistic ground of all morality in our ethically progressive and humane age, Nietzsche attempts to show that this assessment is both hypocritical and false. According to him, pity is never altruistic. Properly examined, it is the agreeable sensation of exerting one’s power over another individual. In pitying, we make the object of our benevolence indebted to and dependent on us; in a sense we appropriate her. While noble individuals desire to confront their equals, lower types exploit the suffering of the weak as an opportunity for their appropriation. Nietzsche describes pity as “the most agreeable feeling among those who have little pride and no prospects of great conquests; for them easy prey—and that is what all who suffer are—is enchanting. Pity is praised as the virtue of prostitutes” (GS 87–88).

According to Nietzsche, pity derives from self-contempt and avoidance of self-perfection. Due to an inability to endure ourselves, we attempt to flee our own subjectivity and to enter that of our neighbor through pity. Zarathustra undermines this seeming virtue, proclaiming, “Your love of the neighbor is your bad love of yourselves. You flee to your neighbor from yourselves and would like to make a virtue of that: but I see through your ‘selflessness’” (Z 172). To compensate for our self-loathing, we seduce our neighbor into loving us, and feel validated through his error. In pitying our neighbor, we ask not only that pity be felt for him, but for ourselves as well. We thereby make our suffering the central feature of our own existence, degrading ourselves further. Pity is also felt by those who seek to avoid the arduous path of self-perfection. Nietzsche writes that “all such arousing of pity and calling for help is secretly seductive, for our ‘own way’ is too hard and demanding” (GS 270). In escaping into the conscience of others, we avoid confronting our own selves, luxuriating instead in the comfort of neighbor-love.
Nietzsche argues that pity degrades both its bestower and its object. The act of pitying is marked by derision for the object. The object, in turn, senses the superior power of the pitier, and responds with resentment. At the same time, the pitier is profoundly weakened by pity, since it forces him to partake in the suffering of others, and to fix his attention on the ugliest and weakest types. Nietzsche writes that “we are deprived of strength when we feel pity. That loss of strength which suffering as such inflicts on life is still further increased and multiplied by pity. Pity makes suffering contagious” (A 572–73). Pity thus saps the power of the few strong and healthy types, destroying their confidence in man. It leads to an unhealthy preoccupation with suffering, rather than a joyful affirmation of life. Nietzsche decries it as “a pathological and dangerous condition, which one would be well advised to attack now and then with a purge” (A 574).

This perverted emotional state is not to be confused with true love of one’s fellowman. In the first place, “our personal and profoundest suffering is incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost everyone; here we remain hidden from our neighbor, even if we eat from one pot” (GS 269). Our suffering is profoundly personal, and our neighbor manages only to demean and misinterpret it. If a kindred soul were truly to comprehend our suffering, he would recognize it as the necessary path to our self-perfection, the fire in which we are reborn. The one who loves us would urge us to suffer more deeply and would rejoice in the prospect of our becoming. Pity, on the other hand, does not perceive the sufferer’s potential self-perfection and thus degrades her by viewing her suffering as an end, and not as a becoming. If possible, pity seeks to assuage the sufferer’s wounds, and to put a quick end to her suffering.

Nietzsche also dissects pity on the socio-historical level. In The Genealogy of Morals, the master forms of morality are distinguished from the resentful and decadent forms pertaining to the herd. Pity falls into the latter category. According to Nietzsche’s historical reconstruction, out of resentment of the superabundant power of the strong, the weak condemn the healthy virtues of the nobles and elevate the herd values of the weak, including pity. Pity does not stem from the mastery of one’s cruel impulses, but rather from weakness and the inability to inflict suffering. Nietzsche describes this masquerade for weakness: “The ‘religion of pity’ to which one would like to convert us—oh, we know the hysterical little males and females well enough who today need precisely
this religion as a veil and make-up" (GS 339). Since they lack claws, the weak condemn the selfishness and cruelty of the strong and oblige them to help the weak. However, this democratization leads to degeneracy, and to the elevation of comfort over strength. For Nietzsche, the paradigm case of pity is Christian love, which derives from Jewish ressentiment. In this inversion of values, the weak proclaim themselves blessed and propagate an ideal of pity, not strength.

Nietzsche argues that this inversion of values also leads to profound nihilism and pessimism. Noble values that elevate the instincts and affirm life are replaced by a value-system that views the world as sick. Nietzsche calls pity "the practice of nihilism. . . . It multiplies misery and conserves all that is miserable, and is thus a prime instrument of the advancement of decadence: pity persuades men to nothingness!" (A 573). Pity is unable to accept suffering as one element of life, but rather desires to eradicate it. In drawing all of man's attention to suffering, and not to joy or ascendancy, it results in a hatred of this world and of life. Nietzsche sees this hatred in attempts to justify life though the creation of alternate realities in religions.

According to Nietzsche, the result of this nihilism is the degeneration of society and of the human species. While "the strongest and most evil spirits have so far done the most to advance humanity" (GS 79), pity desires to castrate these strong types, to sap their strength, and to force them to conform to the herd. Pity is an attempt to make the strong feel guilty for their strength, to condemn the very cruelty and power that enable them to advance the species. The result is a weak hospital-society of neighborly sheep, commiserating about their mutual suffering and lowliness. Pity also "crosses the law of development, which is the law of selection. It preserves what is ripe for destruction; it defends those who have been disinherited and condemned by life" (A 573).

At this point, one must ask whether the sick and decadent form of pity which Nietzsche describes is the only possibility. Is there a means to respond to the suffering of one's fellowman with affirmation and joy? Just as art, religion and philosophy all possess positive and negative manifestations for Nietzsche, so too pity admits of a dual interpretation. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche writes:

All passions have a phase when they are merely disastrous, when they drag down their victim with the weight of their stupidity and
a later, very much later phase when they wed the spirit, when they
“spiritualize” themselves. (T 486)

Nietzsche advocates this spiritualization of the passions, not their extirpation. If Nietzsche would allow that pity, like cruelty, is an instinct, then he would have to concede that the instinct to sympathize should not merely be suppressed, but rather should be interpreted by the organism in a life-affirming manner. Nietzsche seems to draw such a distinction by claiming that “a man who is by nature a master—when such a man has pity, well this pity has value. But what good is the pity of those who suffer?" (BGE 230).

Perhaps as a result of his preoccupation with contradicting popular morality, or due to his concern with negating the elevation of pity in Schopenhauer’s nihilistic philosophy, Nietzsche fails to draw a clear distinction between these two types of pity. In this essay, I will denote the higher, healthy form of pity as “compassion.” Nietzsche’s use of the term Mitleid to denote pity presents a problem for drawing a distinction between pity and compassion because both have the same literal meaning: “suffering with.” However, Nietzsche is prone to the radical re-interpretation of language, and Mitleid can best be understood by what Nietzsche typically uses the term to denote, namely the weak, nihilistic affect of pity. In English, at least, there seems to be a valid distinction between the terms “compassion” and “pity.” While compassion means “suffering with,” and suggests fellow feeling, pity is the emotional response to the suffering of another person. Thus, according to The Oxford English Dictionary, compassion is felt between “equals and fellow-sufferers,” but pity “implies slight contempt for a person on account of some intellectual or moral inferiority.” The word “compassion” is obviously open to many interpretations. I will simply use it as a rubric for all of the characteristics of the high form of pity which I believe can be found in Nietzsche’s writing. Compassion is therefore the awareness of the suffering of one’s fellowman that does not debase oneself or the other, since it is conjoined with a profound joy in life and an awareness of humanity’s potential greatness.

What really distinguishes compassion from pity? The primary difference is that while pity is life-denying, compassion affirms life. Pity is commiseration with the weak, the hatred of suffering that desires its cessation at all costs. While Nietzsche demands cheerfulness in the face
of suffering, he does not enjoin us to oblivion. Rather, he advocates *amor fati*, the acceptance and affirmation of life, the realization that while life is characterized by suffering, it is still beautiful. Compassion is this ability to look into the abyss, to perceive the suffering of one's fellowman and still to affirm life.

One is able to sustain this love of life due to an awareness of man's potential to become the overman (*Übermensch*). Zarathustra declares that "what is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end; what can be loved in man is that he is an *overture* [*Übergang*] and a *going under* [*Untergang*]" (Z 127). Compassion sees in suffering the birth-pangs of man's higher self, and therefore does not despair. It is the love that Nietzsche celebrates between friends; a friend realizes the suffering of his soul mate, empathizes, but also rejoices and wishes it a hundred times over. Compassion is above pity; it employs suffering to raise man, instead of wallowing in a state of passive commiseration.

Compassion therefore results from a feeling of overabundant power, and is not the contemptible attempt to increase one's power by appropriation. It is other-oriented; it grows out of one's species-awareness, not out of a desire to hide from the self. Since compassion involves feeling with the other, it is not derisive as is pity. It does not lead to degeneration or weakness; the compassionate physician will amputate a limb rather than allow the organism to perish. Indeed, Nietzsche states that "the weak and the failures shall perish: first principle of our love of man" (A 570). In the higher man, compassion for suffering humanity is always secondary to his love of the overman. This love justifies the suffering that surrounds him and prevents his compassion from becoming a denial of life and a cause of species-degeneration.

Compassion can be interpreted as the result of the combination of two fundamental drives in Nietzsche's thought: tragedy and friendship. While Silenus declares that "what would be best for you is quite beyond your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be *nothing*" (BOT 29), through their participation in tragic drama, the Greeks are able to respond to the suffering endemic in existence, and to continue affirming life. This is achieved by losing one's own subjective existence and entering the subjectivity of the Dionysiac hero. Similarly, through compassion, we enter the subjectivity of another and partake in this suffering. Unmediated, this would be a horrific unveiling, but in the case of compassion, the Apollonian veil of illusion is replaced by our
vision of the ideal man. As Zarathustra declares, “The overman is the meaning of the earth” (Z 125).

Friendship is this perception of the ideal in one’s beloved. While compassion is directed towards humankind in general, friendship can be viewed as a specific case of compassion. In friendship, people are united by their mutual striving for a common goal (GS 89). While one commiserates with a friend’s suffering, one must hide this, and act as “a resting place for his suffering . . . a hard bed as it were, a field cot” (Z 202). As a field cot, one does not remove one’s friend from his battles, but enables him to re-enter, refreshed and stronger. While a friend sympathizes with his soul mate, he does not coddle or indulge him, but enjoins him to pursue their shared ideal of the higher man with even greater vigor. Thus, while tragedy involves the capacity to confront suffering, friendship provides the mediating ideal of the higher man. This realization of universal suffering and response to its particular instances become conjoined through compassion.

While Nietzsche does not explicitly acknowledge a spiritualized form of pity, his ideal of the noble man embodies many of the qualities that I have linked to compassion. The noble type is not the blond beast, but rather “the passionate man who controls his passions” (Kaufmann 278). Although he refrains from unrestrained emotionalism, the noble type is not without compassion, since such an absence “means to be sick in spirit and body. But one ought to have much spirit to be permitted to be compassionate” (Musarionausgabe 14:54; Thiele’s translation [91] emended). This noble type is characterized by

the feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would give and bestow: the noble human being, too, helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from pity, but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power. (BGE 205)

The compassion that results from overflowing power can be witnessed in the Greek aristocrat who views the weak as miserable and unhappy, and treats him with forbearance (GM 37–38).

This overflowing power can also be seen in the early Zarathustra, who leaves his cave to impart his wisdom because his soul is overflowing. He teaches the dying tightrope walker to affirm his death, but does
not seek to save the man. Zarathustra's soul is unmoved throughout; he remains joyful and healthy. Later, he recounts an encounter with a young shepherd who has a horrific snake in his throat. Zarathustra's first impulse is to tear the snake out, but instead he orders the shepherd to bite its head off (Z 271–72). While the snake is portrayed as the source of sin in the Christian tradition, it is viewed as a symbol of life in many Eastern religions (Campbell 45–48). In continually shedding its skin and being reborn, the snake might even be considered an image of eternal recurrence. Thus, perhaps when Zarathustra overcomes his pity and orders the shepherd to bite the snake, he is actually symbolically enjoining the shepherd to save himself by consuming and embracing life. Whatever interpretation one chooses to impose on the snake episode, it seems uncontroversial to note that in ordering the shepherd to save himself, Zarathustra is acting out of compassion rather than mere pity. The shepherd is transformed through this act; he is “no longer human—one changed, radiant, laughing!” (Z 272). At this moment Zarathustra experiences such profound joy that he can himself accept eternal recurrence; he too is elevated through compassion.

This act of looking into the abyss of human suffering and reacting with joy is obviously not possible for the weak, who constitute the majority of humanity. They will invariably respond with nihilistic pessimism, or with extreme emotionalism. As Nietzsche points out, “What serves the higher type of men as nourishment or delection must almost be poison for a very different and inferior type” (BGE 42). As a healthy response to life, compassion must be understood as possessing a hierarchical dimension; it is not a democratic affect like pity. The strength and joy required to partake in compassion are possessed only by the very few; “even the most courageous among us only rarely has the courage for that which he really knows” (T 466).

The strong type will invariably feel graciousness for the low. Graciousness is noncontemptuous pity arising from excessive strength. This type of compassion is limited, since the high spirit, pertaining to a different species of man than the weak, can never fully share their experience of life. The noble man will acknowledge the suffering of the weak, and perhaps feel sorrow for them, but will not attempt to alleviate their suffering, realizing that the low could not be other than they are. Perhaps, like Zarathustra, he will possess the optimistic hope that the weak might convalesce: “Zarathustra is gentle with the sick...
they become convalescents, men of overcoming, and create a higher body for themselves!” (Z 145). For the intermediate man, the high man will act as a hard bed and a midwife, and for his kindred soul, he will respond by rejoicing in the potential that his friend’s suffering suggests. If compassion is reserved for only the highest man, then how are limited beings to respond to suffering? It seems that as long as the pity of the lowest types does not become universalized, then it probably benefits them. Since their mediocrity is unredeemable, the low need the form of communal delusion and self-justification offered by pity. “One still loves one’s neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warmth” (Z 129). The most problematic type of man regarding compassion is the intermediate man, the man who has not yet become. For him compassion is a danger since he is not yet fully developed, and compassion can still degenerate into a pity which would turn him from the path of perfection to nihilism or pessimism. Perhaps, like Zarathustra, this type of man must retreat into the wilderness and complete his self-perfection before he can engage in compassion without pity.

It is therefore imperative that compassion be exercised only with the greatest thoughtfulness and caution. Nietzsche writes, “One ought to hold on to one’s heart; for if one lets it go, one soon loses control of the head too. Alas, where in the world has there been more folly than among the pitying?” (Z 202). Compassion must not lead away from life, or into nihilism; it must not contaminate the strong. The tearing of the veil from life can be performed only by the strongest and most joyful types, those who are sure of man’s ideal, because they see it in themselves. Compassion belongs properly to the domain of the strong, and presents the greatest risk and challenge.

Nietzsche’s philosophy is primarily concerned with portraying the ideal of a higher type of man. But his fear that pity might weaken or contaminate the noble man appears to undercut the very ideal that he constructs. Nietzsche’s noble type is filled with overflowing strength and joy, and therefore ought not to be horrified by the weak and the ugly. In fact, according to Nietzsche, the noble man declares that “the world is perfect . . . imperfection, whatever is beneath us, . . . even the chandala [my italics] still belongs to this perfection” (A 645). Such a magnanimous and instinctual man has the strength required to look into the abyss. Indeed this is the very proof of his nobility: “Excess of strength alone is the proof of strength” (T 465). Why, then, does Nietzsche have such a
great fear that the strong might be contaminated by the weak through compassion? Rather than encouraging them to confront this great danger, Nietzsche argues that “the healthy should be segregated from the sick, guarded even from the sight of the sick, that they may not confound themselves with the sick” (GM 124). But if the highest man is truly healthy, then he would not need this moral quarantining; he would be immune to the illnesses of the weak. In his excessive fear of the contamination of the strong, Nietzsche does not act as their true friend, but rather weakens the strong through pity.

While Nietzsche argues that the strong should conserve their strength through isolationism, his doctrine of the will to power suggests another contradiction. The will to power is the overflowing force of life, energy, creation and destruction that is present in the entire cosmos, from the smallest particle to the most complex organism. In the noble individual, this power constitutes the overflowing energy that allows him to feel compassion for his fellowman. In him, “the instinct of self-preservation is suspended, as it were; the overpowering pressure of out-flowing forces forbids him any such care or caution. People call this ‘self-sacrifice’ . . . without exception, misunderstandings” (T 548).

While Nietzsche believes that “his feeling of power, his will to power, his courage, his pride—all fall with the ugly” (T 526), it seems that the will to power of the noble individual should be overflowing and constantly self-replenishing. In arguing that the noble man must be parsimonious and cautious with his power, Nietzsche underlines the very strength of the noble type.

Most importantly, though, the will to power permeates all of creation, and creates an interconnectedness between man, his fellows and nature. It is this state of de-individuation that Nietzsche expounds in *The Birth of Tragedy*. The Greeks were able to experience “the glorious transport which arises in man, even from the very depths of nature, at the shattering of the principium individuationis” (BOT 22). This interconnectedness arises when one feels compassion for another; one partakes in his existence. But Nietzsche argues for an isolationist form of self-perfection, and exhorts man to flee society so that he can pursue his self-improvement undisturbed and uncontaminated. Nietzsche writes, “Do I recommend love of the neighbor to you? Sooner I should recommend even flight from the neighbor and love of the farthest” (Z 173). This flight from society to contemplate one’s own nature suggests a
self-absorption and susceptibility to the influence of others that can be viewed only as a weak attempt to hide from life. It seems that the noble type should be able to pursue his self-perfection while in the midst of humanity; he should embrace the communal existence implied by the will to power and feel compassion for mankind.

Finally, compassion seems to be inextricably linked to the experience of amor fati. Amor fati is the love of fate that is so great that it is able to embrace all of existence, in its chaos, cruelty and meaninglessness, and to will it upon oneself eternally. It is the ability to look into the abyss of life and redeem it by finding life beautiful as it is, to wish for the greatest joy and the deepest suffering over and over. Nietzsche writes that “to redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I willed it’—that alone should I call redemption” (Z 251). The doctrine of eternal recurrence is at first too awful for Zarathustra to bear, because it implies the reappearance of that which he despises most, the mediocre man. Zarathustra says, “This is what is terrible for my eyes, that I find man in ruins and scattered as over a battlefield or a butcherfield. . . . [I find] fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents” (Z 250). To accept the degenerate abortion of nature that is man, indeed to affirm it and love it and wish its reappearance into eternity—for Zarathustra this constitutes the greatest challenge. But strength requires that one be able to confront the suffering of even the weakest and most hopeless man and that one rejoice in his existence. One must be able to feel compassion for all of humanity without descending into emotionalism or nihilism. Thus, the doctrine of eternal recurrence serves to separate the chaff from the wheat. The strongest, most life-affirming man need not hide his face from the suffering of his fellow, but will be able to affirm this suffering joyfully. Nietzsche writes that “only now are you going your way to greatness! Peak and abyss—they are now joined together” (Z 264).

In claiming that the highest man should not pity the weak, but should look away from their suffering and ugliness, Nietzsche seems to betray his ideal of amor fati. In arguing that pity should be avoided since it contaminates, drains and saddens the noble man, Nietzsche implies that the noble type should shield his face before the abyss of life and avoid the ultimate affirmation of all that is. Perhaps Nietzsche's negative valuation of pity derives from his own fear of suffering and mediocrity. He writes, “I know . . . that I only need to expose myself to the sight of
some genuine distress and I am lost” (GS 270). Indeed, Nietzsche’s inability to accept the weak is betrayed by his overwhelming contempt of man. “At this point I do not suppress a sigh,” he writes, “There are days when I am afflicted with a feeling blacker than the blackest melancholy—contempt of man” (A 610). But Nietzsche’s own philosophy maintains that one must have the strength to engage in compassion. He writes, “Brave is he who knows fear but conquers fear, who sees the abyss, but with pride” (Z 400).

If Nietzsche’s philosophy requires the strength to affirm the suffering of the weak through compassion, then why in the end does Zarathustra leave the higher man and flee into the wilderness? Why does Zarathustra feel that overcoming his pity for the higher man is his final challenge? As he departs, Zarathustra declares that his day has begun, that he will focus on his work. Perhaps since Nietzsche’s philosophy is fundamentally centered around self-perfection, community virtues can never assume a primary role. Kaufmann states, “It may well be that any ethic in which the highest good is the individual’s state of being . . . entails some deprecation of overly great concern about others” (318). Compassion might be a trait associated with the highest character, but it cannot be of central import to Nietzsche’s thought. However, Zarathustra’s delicacy and need for isolation also suggests that he may not yet be Nietzsche’s highest type. He cannot yet experience suffering without responding with pity, disgust and despondency. Zarathustra is still unable to fully embrace man’s mediocrity; he is not yet the overman.

While Zarathustra is not yet able to accept the greatest challenge, and to engage in compassion, Nietzsche himself can be viewed as a paradigm of the compassionate man. While Zarathustra flees man’s mediocrity, Nietzsche continues to write: “Injustice and filth they throw after the lonely one: but, my brother, if you would be a star, you must not shine less for them because of that” (Z 176). In acting as a cultural physician, Nietzsche betrays his own love and compassion for man. Like the true friend, Nietzsche ruthlessly exposes humanity’s mediocrity to us and urges us onto the difficult path of self-perfection. In his writing, Nietzsche is able not only to examine humanity’s weakness, but also to find joy in the potential for the overman. However, Nietzsche’s writing is also marked by a condemnation of pity in all its forms, and by an overly protectionist attitude to the overman. He writes that “God is dead; God
died of his pity for man" (Z 202). Perhaps Nietzsche's rejection of pity ultimately stems from an inability to affirm humanity's suffering and from a fear that in the cycle of eternal recurrence, our mediocrity will never give way to a higher man.
Works Cited


